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ABSTRACT 
 
Offshoring and Unemployment*
 
In this paper, in order to study the impact of offshoring on sectoral and economywide rates of 
unemployment, we construct a two sector general equilibrium model in which labor is mobile 
across the two sectors, and unemployment is caused by search frictions. We find that, 
contrary to general perception, wage increases and sectoral unemployment decreases due to 
offshoring. This result can be understood to arise from the productivity enhancing (cost 
reducing) effect of offshoring. If the search cost is identical in the two sectors, or even if the 
search cost is higher in the sector which experiences offshoring, the economywide rate of 
unemployment decreases. We also find multiple equilibrium outcomes in the extent of 
offshoring and therefore, in the unemployment rate. Furthermore, a firm can increase its 
domestic employment through offshoring. Also, such a firm's domestic employment can be 
higher than a firm that chooses to remain fully domestic. When we modify the model to 
disallow intersectoral labor mobility, the negative relative price effect on the sector in which 
firms offshore some of their activity becomes stronger. In such a case, it is possible for this 
effect to offset the positive productivity effect, and result in a rise in unemployment in that 
sector. In the other sector, offshoring has a much stronger unemployment reducing effect in 
the absence of intersectoral labor mobility than in the presence of it. Finally, allowing for an 
endogenous number of varieties provides an additional indirect channel, through which 
sectoral unemployment goes down due to the entry of new firms brought about by offshoring. 
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1 Introduction
"Oﬀshoring" is the sourcing of inputs (goods and services) from foreign countries. When production of these
inputs moves to foreign countries, the fear at home is that jobs will be lost and unemployment will rise.
In the recent past, this has become an important political issue. The remarks by Greg Mankiw, when he
was Head of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers, that "outsourcing is just a new way of doing
international trade" and is "a good thing" came under sharp attack from prominent politicians from both
sides of the aisle. Recent estimates by Forrester Research of job losses due to oﬀshoring equaling a total of
3.3 million white collar jobs by 2015 and the prediction by Deloitte Research of the outsourcing of 2 million
financial sector jobs by the year 2009 have drawn a lot of attention from politicians and journalists (Drezner,
2004), even though these job losses are only a small fraction of the total number unemployed, especially when
we take into account the fact that these losses will be spread over many years.1 Furthermore, statements
by IT executives have added fuel to this fire. One such statement was made by an IBM executive who
said "[Globalization] means shifting a lot of jobs, opening a lot of locations in places we had never dreamt
of before, going where there is low-cost labor, low-cost competition, shifting jobs oﬀshore", while another
statement was made by Hewlett-Packard CEO Carly Fiorna in her testimony before Congress that "there
is no job that is America’s God-given right anymore" (Drezner, 2004). The alarming estimates by Bardhan
and Kroll (2003) and McKinsey (2005) that 11 percent of our jobs are potentially at risk of being oﬀshored
have provided politicians with more ammunition for their position on this issue.
While the relation between oﬀshoring and unemployment has been an important issue for politicians, the
media and the public, there has hardly been any careful theoretical analysis of this relationship by economists.
In this paper, in order to study the impact of oﬀshoring on sectoral and economywide rates of unemployment,
we construct a two sector general equilibrium model in which unemployment is caused by search frictions
a la Pissarides (2000). Firms in an imperfectly competitive, diﬀerentiated products sector use two inputs
to produce varieties of an intermediate good. The production of one of these inputs can be oﬀshored
after incurring a fixed cost, while the other input (which we call headquarter services) must be produced
domestically. There is a large variety of these intermediate goods used in the production of a homogeneous
good produced under perfect competition. There is another sector that produces a homogeneous good under
perfect competition and whose production is less sophisticated in that it uses only labor (under constant
1The average number of gross job losses per week in the US is about 500,000 (Blinder, 2006). Also see Bhagwati, Panagariya
and Srinivasan (2004) on the plausibility and magnitudes of available estimates of the unemployment eﬀects of oﬀshoring.
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returns to scale). In the absence of oﬀshoring there is a unique equilibrium in the economy. It is shown
that when we allow the possibility of oﬀshoring, there exists the possibility of multiple equilibria: (1) an
equilibrium with no oﬀshoring, (2) a mixed equilibrium where a fraction of firms oﬀshore while others source
their inputs domestically, and finally (3) an equilibrium where all firms oﬀshore their input production.
Oﬀshoring reduces the cost of producing intermediate goods, and consequently the cost of the good using
these intermediates. When a large number of intermediate firms oﬀshore, the cost of production of the
intermediate-using sophisticated good is low and therefore, its price is low. This, in turn, results in a high
quantity demanded and hence a large scale of production of this good and a large market for intermediate
goods. Thus, a large amount of oﬀshoring is feasible and large scale production at a low cost and selling
at a low price remain sustainable. On the other hand when very few intermediate firms oﬀshore, the cost
of production and the price of the intermediate-using good are high and the resulting scale of production is
small, which in turn can support oﬀshoring only by a few firms.
Looking at the impact of oﬀshoring on unemployment and wages, we find that, contrary to general
perception, wage increases and sectoral unemployment decreases due to oﬀshoring. This result can be
understood to arise from the productivity enhancing (cost reducing) eﬀect of oﬀshoring.2 While the incentive
to create vacancies (per worker) in the sector where oﬀshoring takes place increases due to the productivity
eﬀect of oﬀshoring, in the other sector this incentive increases due to an improvement in its relative price.
Therefore, more jobs are created in both sectors, thereby putting an upward pressure on wages and a
downward pressure on unemployment in each sector.3
The impact of oﬀshoring on overall economywide unemployment, however, depends on how the structure
or the composition of the economy changes. Even though both sectors have lower unemployment post-
oﬀshoring, whether the sector with the lower unemployment or higher unemployment expands will also
be a determinant of the overall unemployment rate. If the search cost is identical in the two sectors,
implying identical rates of sectoral unemployment, then the economywide rate of unemployment declines
unambiguously after oﬀshoring. Alternatively, if the search cost is higher in the sector which experiences
2This is due to the increase in the marginal product of the workers at the headquarters arising from employment of more
production input per headquarter worker (since the input is now cheaper) in the oﬀshoring firms.
3Oﬀshoring of production activity in one sector makes the other sector relatively more intensive in the use of domestic labor.
At the same time, oﬀshoring raises the relative price of the good whose production is not oﬀshored, i.e., of the good that is
domestic labor intensive. Therefore, cost of domestic labor (wage rate and market tightness) goes up. This eﬀect is analogous
to the Stolper-Samuelson eﬀect.
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oﬀshoring (implying a higher wage as well as higher rate of unemployment in that sector), the economywide
rate of unemployment also decreases then because some workers move to the other sector which has a lower
unemployment rate.
Masked behind the intersectoral reallocation of labor is intra-sectoral reallocation of labor within the
diﬀerentiated goods sector in response to oﬀshoring. Output is reallocated from firms that do not oﬀshore
to firms that oﬀshore because the latter have lower marginal costs of production and hence charge lower
prices. However, the reallocation of employment is not the same as that of output. Firms that oﬀshore a part
of their production process increase their employment of workers involved in the production of headquarter
services. However, since they reduce their employment in production activities, the net impact is ambiguous.
The higher the headquarter intensity of an industry, the more likely it is that oﬀshoring firms increase their
employment relative to firms that do not oﬀshore.
Next, we modify our model to disallow labor mobility across the labor forces of the two sectors. This can
be considered to be the shorter-run version of the model with labor mobility. It also provides some extra
insights that we otherwise would have missed. Under both labor mobility and no labor mobility, there are two
eﬀects of oﬀshoring on the sector that uses the oﬀshored input. One is the cost reducing or the productivity
enhancing eﬀect, while the other is the reduction in the relative price. The second eﬀect is stronger under
no labor mobility than under mobile labor and if this eﬀect is strong enough, the sectoral unemployment
rate may go up in this sector. Whether this will be the case or not will depend on the importance of this
good in final consumption and on the headquarter intensity in the production of this good. We want to
reiterate that the rise in unemployment upon oﬀshoring is only a possibility that can happen under certain
conditions. A reduction of unemployment is also possible in this shorter run model. The favorable relative
price eﬀect of oﬀshoring on the other sector (in which production is always fully domestic) is stronger under
no labor mobility than under mobile labor. Therefore, the reduction in the unemployment rate in this sector
(due to oﬀshoring) is greater in the short-run than in the model with intersectoral labor mobility.
We finally perform another extension of the model in which we have an endogenous number of varieties
of the intermediate good. Oﬀshoring leads to an increase in the variety of intermediates in equilibrium that
leads to a further productivity increase and therefore a further reduction in unemployment. Thus, allowing
for an endogenous number varieties in the oﬀshoring sector provides an additional indirect channel through
which sectoral unemployment goes down.
Our theoretical results are consistent with the empirical results of Amiti and Wei (2005a, b) for the
US and the UK. They find no support for the “anxiety” of “massive job losses” associated with oﬀshore
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outsourcing from developed to developing countries.4 Using data on 78 sectors in the UK for the period
1992-2001, they find no evidence in support of a negative relationship between employment and outsourcing.
In fact, in many of their specifications the relationship is positive. In the US case, they find a very small,
negative eﬀect of oﬀshoring on employment if the economy is decomposed into 450 narrowly defined sectors
which disappears when one looks at more broadly defined 96 sectors. Alongside this result, they also find a
positive relationship between oﬀshoring and productivity. These results are consistent with opposing eﬀects
on employment (and unemployment) created by oﬀshoring. In this context , Amiti and Wei (2005a) write:
“On the one hand, every job lost is a job lost. On the other hand, firms that have outsourced may become
more eﬃcient and expand employment in other lines of work. If firms relocate their relatively ineﬃcient
parts of the production process to another country, where they can be produced more cheaply, they can
expand their output in production for which they have comparative advantage. These productivity benefits
can translate into lower prices generating further demand and hence create more jobs. This job creation
eﬀect could in principle oﬀset job losses due to outsourcing.” This intuition is consistent with the channels in
our model and the reason for obtaining a result that shows a reduction in sectoral and overall unemployment
as a result of oﬀshoring.
Before, we try to relate our work to the existing literature, we would like to say a couple of things in defense
of our modeling strategy. Firstly, it is quite easy to imagine that there will be fixed costs associated with
oﬀshoring. An analytically tractable way to handle fixed costs here is to depart from perfect competition.
This is why the intermediate goods sector which oﬀshores input production is assumed to be imperfectly
competitive in this paper. An additional benefit of using the imperfectly competitive framework is the ability
to study the case when the number of firms is endogenous and to look at productivity eﬀects of oﬀshoring
through changes in input variety. We also introduce cost or productivity heterogeneity, which has been done
to make the coexistence of oﬀshoring and non-oﬀshoring firms more likely in the same industry in equilibrium
(when oﬀshoring is allowed at a cost).
We next turn to the existing literature. While the relationship between oﬀshoring and unemployment
has not been analytically studied before by economists, there is now a vast literature on oﬀshoring and
outsourcing.5 All the models in that literature, following the tradition in standard trade theory, assume full
4The oﬀshoring variable they use, which they call oﬀshoring intensity, is defined as the share of imported inputs (material
or service) as a proportion of total nonenergy inputs used by the industry.
5 See for instance Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2003, 2005), Antras (2003), Antras and Helpman (2004) and Feenstra and
Hanson (2005).
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employment. In spite of this assumption in the existing literature, it is important to note that our results
are similar in spirit to those in an important recent contribution by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006)
where they model oﬀshoring as "trading in tasks" and show that even factors of production whose tasks
are oﬀshored can benefit from oﬀshoring due to its productivity enhancing eﬀect. Also closely related to
our work is a very recent working paper by Davidson, Matusz and Shevchenko (2006) that uses a model of
job search to study the impact of oﬀshoring of high-tech jobs on low and high-skilled workers’ wages, and
on overall welfare. Another paper looking at the impact of oﬀshoring on the labor market is Karabay and
McLaren (2006) who study the eﬀects of free trade and oﬀshore outsourcing on wage volatility and worker
welfare in a model where risk sharing takes place through employment relationships. Rodriguez-Clare (2006)
analyzes the positive productivity eﬀect and the negative terms of trade eﬀect of oﬀshoring on wages and
welfare within a Ricardian framework. Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinivasan (2004) also analyze in detail
the welfare and wage eﬀects of oﬀshoring.
It is also important to note that there does exist a literature on the relationship between trade and
unemployment. Previous work on unemployment in an open economy includes minimum wage models
(Brecher, 1974a, b and Davis,1998a, b), implicit contract models (Matusz, 1986), eﬃciency wage models
(Brecher, 1992; Brecher and Choudhri,1994; Copeland, 1989; Hoon, 2001; and Matusz, 1994), and search
models (Davidson and Matusz, 2004 and S¸ener, 2001, Moore and Ranjan (2005)). None of these models
deals with oﬀshoring.
2 A Model of Oﬀshoring and Unemployment
2.1 Preferences
All agents share the identical lifetime utility functionZ ∞
t=0
Ct exp−rt ds, (1)
where C is consumption, r is the discount rate, and t is a time index. Asset markets are complete. There
is perfect certainty, aside from one-time, unanticipated shocks. The form of the utility function implies that
the risk-free interest rate, in terms of consumption, equals r.
Each worker has one unit of labor to devote to market activities at every instant of time. The total size
of the workforce is L. The final consumption good C could be assumed to be produced using two goods Z
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and X as inputs follows, or equivalently can be considered to be a composite (basket) of these two goods as
follows:
C =
ZγX1−γ
γγ(1− γ)1−γ (2)
We choose the composite consumption good C as numeraire. Let Pz and Px be the prices of Z and X,
respectively. Since the price of C = 1, we get
P γz P
1−γ
x = 1 ⇐⇒ Px = (Pz)
γ
γ−1 (3)
Therefore, an increase in Pz implies a decrease in Px.
Also, (2) implies that the relative demand for Z is given byµ
Z
X
¶d
=
γPx
(1− γ)Pz
=
γ (Pz)
1
γ−1
(1− γ) (4)
So, the relative demand for Z is decreasing in Pz.
2.2 Production and Profit Maximization in the Z sector
Z is produced using a continuum of diﬀerentiated intermediate goods produced by monopolistically compet-
itive firms. The production function for Z is given as follows.
Z =
⎡
⎣
Z
i∈I
z(i)
σ−1
σ di
⎤
⎦
σ
σ−1
, σ > 1 (5)
where z(i) is the intermediate good of variety i and I is the set of all existing varieties. Now, the above
production function for the final good results in the following demand function for intermediate good of
variety i:
z(i) =
p(i)−σR
i∈I
p(i)1−σdi
PzZ (6)
where PzZ denotes the aggregate expenditure on Z, the price of Z, Pz is given by
Pz ≡
⎡
⎣
Z
i∈I
p(i)1−σdi
⎤
⎦
1
1−σ
(7)
So the demand for each intermediate good can be re-written as
z(i) =
µ
p(i)
Pz
¶−σ
Z (8)
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Note from the above equation that the elasticity of demand facing each intermediate good producer is σ,
which is also the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties. The productivity of an intermediate
good producer is denoted by α, and the distribution of the productivity levels of all intermediate good
producers is given by a distribution G(α), where α ∈ [α, α]. We assume here (for the most part) a fixed
mass of firms. In the penultimate section (section 4), we will relax this assumption where each entering firm
will have to incur a sunk cost equal to FE in terms of the numeraire good, after which it will observe its
realization of productivity drawn from G(α).
The production function for an intermediate good producing firm with productivity α is given by
z(α) =
1
ττ (1− τ)1−τ αmh(α)
τmp(α)1−τ (9)
where mh is the labor requirement for certain core activities which have to remain within the home country
and mp is the labor input required for other activities which can potentially be oﬀshored. Denote the
marginal cost of a firm with productivity α by c(α). Given the constant elasticity of demand for each firm,
the price charged by a firm with productivity α,denoted by p(α) is going to equal σσ−1c(α). If M is the mass
of firms in the industry, we can write the price of Z as follows.
Pz =M
1
1−σ
"Z α
α
p(α)1−σdG(α)
# 1
1−σ
(10)
In this section we will assume M = 1, that is, there is a unit mass of firms in the industry. As mentioned
above, in a later section we endogenize M, where we show that the qualitative results are unchanged.
Therefore, for the purposes of this section, the price of Z is simply
Pz =
"Z α
α
p(α)1−σdG(α)
# 1
1−σ
(11)
and the demand facing a firm with productivity α is
z(α) =
µ
p(α)
Pz
¶−σ
Z (12)
If we denote the total amount of labor employed by firm with productivity α by N(α), then we have
N(α) = mh(α) +mp(α) (13)
To produce intermediate goods, a firm needs to open job vacancies and hire workers. The cost of vacancy
in terms of the numeraire good is cz. Denote the number of vacancies posted by a firm by V (α). Any job
can be hit with an idiosyncratic shock with probability δ and be destroyed.
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Let Lz be the total number of workers who look for a job in sector Z. Define θz = vzuz as the measure of
market tightness in sector Z, where vzLz is the total number of vacancies in sector Z and uzLz is the number
of unemployed workers searching for a job in sector Z. The probability of a vacancy filled is q(θz) =
m(vz,uz)
vz
wherem(vz, uz) is a constant returns to scale matching function. Sincem(vz, uz) is constant returns to scale,
q0(θz) < 0. The probability of an unemployed worker finding a job is
m(vz,uz)
uz
= θzq(θz) which is increasing
in θz.
Assuming that each firm employs and hires enough workers to resolve the uncertainty of job inflows and
outflows, the dynamics of employment for a firm is
.
N(α) = q(θz)V (α)− δN(α) (14)
The wage for each worker is determined by a process of Nash bargaining with the firm separately which is
discussed later. While deciding on how many vacancies to open up the firm correctly anticipates this wage.
Therefore, the profit maximization condition for an individual firm can be written as
Max
V (α),z(α)
Z ∞
t
e−r(s−t){p(α)z(α)− w(α)N(α)− czV (α)}ds (15)
where z(α) is given in (9) and N(α) is given in (13) and w(α) is taken as given.
Therefore, the firm maximizes (15) subject to (14), (9), and (13). We provide details of the firm’s
maximization exercise in the appendix. Denoting the Lagrangian multiplier associated with (14) by λ, where
λ is the shadow value of an extra job, we get in the steady state
σ−1
σ αp(α)− w(α)
(r + δ)
= λ =
cz
q(θz)
(16)
The expression on the extreme left-hand side is the marginal benefit from a job which equals the present
value of the stream of the marginal revenue product net of wage of an extra worker after factoring in the
probability of job separation each period. The extreme right-hand side expression is the marginal cost of a
job which equals the cost of posting a vacancy, cz multiplied by the average duration of a vacancy, 1q(θz) .
Alternatively, 1q(θz) is the average number of vacancies required to be posted to create a job per unit of time.
cz
q(θz)
will be the asset value of an extra job for a firm in the wage determination below. An alternative way
to write (16) is
p(α) =
σ
σ − 1
w(α)
α
+
σ(r + δ)cz
(σ − 1)q(θz)α
(17)
This is the mark up equation in the presence of search frictions. So, in addition to the standard wage cost,
search cost is added to the marginal cost of producing a unit of output. Note that just as the wage cost is
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inversely related to firm productivity, search cost is inversely related as well, because a more productive firm
needs a smaller labor force to produce a given level of output.
Further, it is straightforward to see from the first-order conditions that z(α) = αN(α) which when plugged
into the dynamic equation of N(α) with the steady state condition
.
N(α) = 0 imposed gives us V (α) = δz(α)q(θz)α .
Thus, the number of vacancies that a firm posts is positively related to output and negatively related to firm
productivity. The equation above also implies that the ratio of vacancies to employment is the same for all
firms. Now, if Lz is the total size of the labor force in the Z sector, then
vzLz =
α∗Z
α
V (α)dG(α) =
δ
q(θz)
α∗Z
α
N(α)dG(α) =
δ
q(θz)
α∗Z
α
z(α)
α
dG(α) (18)
Note that, by definition total employment
α∗Z
α
N(α)dG(α) equals (1− uz)Lz,which after minor manipulation
gives us
uz =
δ
δ + θzq(θz)
(19)
The above is the standard Beveridge curve in Pissarides type search models where the rate of unemployment
is negatively related to the degree market tightness θz.
2.3 Wage Determination in the Z sector
Wage is determined for each worker through a process of Nash bargaining with his/her employer. The value
of an occupied job for a firm, J(α), is the value of λ obtained from firm’s maximization problem. It equals
cz
q(θz)
. Denoting the unemployment benefit in terms of the final good by b and letting Uz denote the income
of the unemployed in the Z sector, the asset value equation for the unemployed in this sector is given by
rUz = b+ θzq(θz)[Ez − Uz] (20)
where Ez is the expected income from becoming employed in the Z sector. As explained in Pissarides
(2000), the asset that is valued is an unemployed worker’s human capital. The return on this asset is the
unemployment benefit b plus the expected capital gain from the possible change in state from unemployed
to employed given by θzq(θz)[Ez − Uz].
The asset value equation for an employed worker working for a firm in sector Z with productivity α is
given by
rE(α) = w(α) + δ(Uz −E(α))⇒ E(α) =
w(α)
r + δ
+
δUz
r + δ
(21)
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Again the return on being employed equals the wage plus the expected change in the asset value from a
change in state from employed to unemployed. The surplus for an unemployed worker from getting a job
with a firm is E(α)−Uz. The surplus for a firm from an occupied job is J(α). Since the wage is determined
using Nash bargaining where the bargaining weights are β and 1− β, we get the following wage bargaining
equation:
E(α)− Uz = β(J(α) + E(α)− Uz) (22)
The equation above is important in delivering our wage equation. Since as seen above J(α) = czq(θz) is the
same for all firms, E(α) − Uz = β1−β
cz
q(θz)
, and therefore E(α) = Ez are the same for all α. Plugging this
value of Ez − Uz into the asset value equation for the unemployed we have a simplified version of this asset
value equation
rUz = b+
β
1− β czθz (23)
Since we know that J(α) = λ =
σ−1
σ αp(α)−w(α)
(r+δ) , this in conjunction with the wage bargaining equation and the
asset value equation of an employed worker gives us the wage of a worker in a firm as the weighted average
of the return on the asset value of an unemployed person and the marginal revenue product of the worker,
the weights being the bargaining power of the firm and the worker respectively. More precisely we have
w(α) = (1− β)rUz + β[σ−1σ p(α)α], which in conjunction with (23) and the fact that
σ−1
σ αp(α)−w(α)
(r+δ) =
cz
q(θz)
gives us the following simplified wage equation:
wz = b+
βcz
1− β [θz +
r + δ
q(θz)
] (24)
Next, we write down the expression for equilibrium profit which is useful in deriving the benefit from
oﬀshoring. It is shown in the appendix that the present discounted value of profits of a firm at time t is
ΠD(α) =
ZPσz
rσσ(σ − 1)1−σ
µ
wz +
(r + δ)cz
q(θz)
¶1−σ
ασ−1 +
cz
q(θz)
Nt(α) (25)
where we have introduced the subscript D to capture the fact that input is produced domestically. The
above equation shows that the profit of a firm is increasing in its productivity. To obtain the present
discounted value of profit of a firm in steady-state, substitute Nt(α) in the expression above by its steady-
state employment. When we allow for free entry of firms to produce diﬀerentiated goods, we will assume
that each firm enters with N = 0, and therefore, its expected present discounted value of profit is obtained
by setting Nt = 0 in (25).
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2.4 Production, Wage Determination and Employment in the X sector
Production of good X is undertaken by perfectly competitive firms. To produce one unit of X a firm needs
to hire one unit of labor. In order to hire a worker a firm has to open a vacancy which is costly. The cost of
vacancy in terms of the numeraire good is cx. Define θx = vxux as the measure of market tightness in the X
sector. The probability of a vacancy filled is q(θx) =
m(vx,ux)
vx
where m(vx, ux) is a constant returns to scale
function same as in the Z sector. Also, jobs are destroyed with probability δ. The cost of posting a vacancy
in sector X is denoted by cx. Firms in the X sector are perfectly competitive, as opposed to imperfect
competition among intermediate goods producers in the Z sector.
Repeating the exercise in the previous section for competitive firms (see Pissarides (2000) for details),
we obtain the following three key equations.
wx = (1− β)b+ β[Px + cxθx] (26)
Px = wx +
(r + δ)cx
q(θx)
(27)
ux =
δ
δ + θxq(θx)
(28)
The above 3 equations determine wx, θx, and ux, for a given Px.
Since unemployed workers can search in either sector, the income of the unemployed must be the same
from searching in either sector. Imposing (23) which gives us the income of the unemployed searching in Z
sector and the corresponding equation for the X sector given by rUx = b + β1−β cxθx on the labor mobility
condition Uz = Ux implies
czθz = cxθx (29)
That is, the labor market tightness for each sector is inversely proportional to the vacancy cost.
2.5 Solving the Model
Let us define the average productivity of firms as follows.
Definition eα ≡ hR αα ασ−1dG(α)i 1σ−1
Next, using (17) write the equation for the price of Z given in (7) as
Pz =
σ
σ − 1
µ
wz +
(r + δ)cz
q(θz)
¶ eα−1 (30)
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Now, start with a Px. Determine wx and θx from (26) and (27). Next, θz is determined from (29). Then wz
is determined from (24). Since we know θz and wz, we can determine Pz from (30). Therefore, for each Px
there is an associated Pz, determined as described above. It is easy to verify that an increase in Px implies
an increase Pz via the relationship described above. Let us call this PPP .
Next, note from (3) that Px = (Pz)
γ
γ−1 . That is, an increase in Pz requires a decrease in Px to keep the
price of numeraire at 1. Let us call this PPN .
The two relationships between Px and Pz, PPP and PPN , uniquely determine the equilibrium values
of Px and Pz. Once we know Px and Pz we obtain wx, θx, and ux from (26)-(28), then we obtain θz, wz, and
uz from (29), (24), and (19), respectively.
Notice the Ricardian element in the model. All the prices are determined by the technological variables
independent of demand conditions. Diagrammatically, the relative supply of Z is a horizontal curve at the
Pz
Px
determined by the intersection of PPP and PPN curves described above. The relative demand for Z is
downward sloping as given by ZX =
γ(Pz)
1
γ−1
(1−γ) and is represented by the RD curve in Figure 1. The horizontal
RS curve (at the price determined by PPP and PPN curves) is the relative supply curve. The intersection
of the two curves determines the equilibrium ZX .
2.6 Equilibria with the possibility of oﬀshoring
Now, suppose firms in the Z sector have the option of procuring input mp from abroad instead of producing
them domestically.6 However, they need to incur a fixed cost of rFV in terms of the numeraire good in
each period. Therefore, the present discounted value of the fixed cost of oﬀshoring is going to be FV .
The per unit cost of imported input is wS in terms of the numeraire good. Now, a firm oﬀshoring its input
maximizes
R∞
t e
−r(s−t){p(α)z(α)−w(α)N(α)−wsmp(α)−czV (α)}ds. The production function now becomes
z(α) = 1ττ (1−τ)1−τ αN(α)
τmp(α)1−τ , while the other constraint is the equation of motion of employment that
remains the same.
From the first-order conditions of this altered maximization problem, we still have λ = czq(θz) . With each
6We are assuming that under autarky a firm uses one unit of labor to produce every unit of this input. Therefore, under
oﬀshoring in place of using mp units of home labor in production activities the firm just imports mp units of the imported
input from abroad.
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firm taking the equilibrium θz as given and given that
.
λ = 0 in steady state, we have
N(α)
mp(α)
=
τws
(1− τ)(w(α) + (r + δ)λ) =
τws
(1− τ)
³
w(α) + (r+δ)czq(θz)
´ (31)
The pricing equation in this case is given by
σ − 1
σ
αp(α) = w1−τs
µ
w(α) +
(r + δ)cz
q(θz)
¶τ
(32)
Next, we turn our attention to wage bargaining in the post-oﬀshoring equilibrium.
Note that since λ = czq(θz) , the value of a job is the same for each firm in equilibrium, and therefore, each
firm pays the same wage irrespective of whether they are oﬀshoring or not. The wage is given by
wz = b+
βcz
1− β [θz +
r + δ
q(θz)
] (33)
In rest of the section we use the following notational simplification.
Definition ω ≡ wz+
(r+δ)cz
q(θz)
ws
In the above definition ω is the cost of domestic labor relative to foreign labor. As far as the steady
state employment and vacancy are concerned, note that in steady-state
.
N(α) = 0, therefore, V (α) = δN(α)q(θz)
as before. The relationship between output and domestic employment for firms that oﬀshore is given by
N(α) = τz(α)α ω
τ−1 while for firms that do not oﬀshore, employment is still given by N(α) = z(α)α . Next,
write the mark-up equation for an oﬀshoring firm as
p(α) =
σ
(σ − 1)α
µ
wz +
(r + δ)cz
q(θz)
¶
ωτ−1 (34)
Starting at the economy’s steady state at time t, the present discounted value of profit (gross of fixed
oﬀshoring costs) of an oﬀshoring firm (whose employment equals Nt(α) at this starting point), holding the
actions of all existing firms taken as given, can be written as7
ΠV (α) =
ZPσz
rσσ(σ − 1)1−σ ω
(σ−1)(1−τ)
µ
wz +
(r + δ)cz
q(θz)
¶1−σ
ασ−1 +
czNt(α)
q(θz)
(35)
If a firm keeps using only domestic labor despite oﬀshoring opportunities, the present discounted value of its
profit is given by
ΠD(α) =
ZPσz
rσσ(σ − 1)1−σ
µ
wz +
(r + δ)cz
q(θz)
¶1−σ
ασ−1 +
czNt(α)
q(θz)
(36)
7The method used is absolutely analogous to the autarky case, that has been spelled out in greater detail above.
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Therefore, in order for a firm to oﬀshore its input production, we need ΠV (α) − ΠD(α) ≥ FV . Note that
the second term, czNt(α)q(θz) in both the profit expressions above is the rent derived by an incumbent firm with
positive employment relative to a new entrant that starts with zero employment. This comes from the fact
that the value of an occupied job is ciq(θi) in sector i = X,Z.
It is clear from a comparison of the profit expressions above that if any firm with productivity α oﬀshores
input production, then any firm with productivity α0 ≥ α also oﬀshores.
To simplify notation, make the following definitional assumption.
Definition CD ≡
³
wz +
(r+δ)cz
q(θz)
´1−σ
rσσ(σ − 1)1−σ ;CV ≡ ω
(σ−1)(1−τ)CD
In order for ΠV (α)−ΠD(α) ≥ FV it must be the case that CV > CD. Therefore, a necessary condition
for a firm to oﬀshore is ω > 1, that is the cost of hiring foreign labor is less than the cost of domestic labor.
Denote the productivity of the marginal firm that is indiﬀerent between oﬀshoring and relying on domestic
sourcing by α∗, where α∗ satisfies
ΠV (α∗)−ΠD(α∗) = FV (37)
It can be easily verified that firms with α ≥ α∗ oﬀshore, while others rely on domestic sourcing. In the appen-
dix we enumerate 11 equations determining the 11 endogenous variables Px, Pz, wx, wz, θx,θz, ux, uz, Lz, Z, α∗
in an equilibrium where firms have the option to oﬀshore. There are three possible post-oﬀshoring equilibria
in the model: 1) No firm oﬀshores (α∗ ≥ α); 2) Some firms oﬀshore (α∗ ∈ (α, α)); 3) All firms oﬀshore
(α∗ ≤ α). Below we provide an intuitive discussion of these equilibria. We first trace out a curve in the
(PzPx ,
Z
X ) space, called the oﬀshoring curve, such that the fraction of firms oﬀshoring varies from zero to 1
along this curve. The oﬀshoring curve is the locus of mutually consistent pairs of PzPx and Z/X along which
the cutoﬀ productivity varies.8 The intersection of this curve with the relative demand curve
¡ Z
X
¢d
= γPx(1−γ)Pz
will give us the equilibrium in the post-oﬀshoring case.
2.6.1 Derivation of the Oﬀshoring Curve
Denote the price of Z when the marginal firm oﬀshoring is α∗ by P ∗z . The expression for P ∗z is given by
8Very loosely speaking, the oﬀshoring curve is the general equilibrium relative supply curve of Z after factoring in the
endogenous oﬀshoring decision of firms. For any price, it gives us the relative supply exactly consistent with the number of
firms oﬀshoring leading to that price. Note, however, that this relative supply is not a behavioral relationship.
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P ∗z =
σ
σ − 1
µ
w
∗
z +
(r + δ)c
∗
z
q(θ
∗
z)
¶⎡
⎣
α∗Z
α
ασ−1dG(α) + ω
∗(σ−1)(1−τ)
αZ
α∗
ασ−1dG(α)
⎤
⎦
1
1−σ
(38)
For each α∗ ∈ [α,α] the equation above along with (3), (26), (27), (29), and (24) determines Px, Pz, wx, wz, θx,θz,
irrespective of the demand condition, same as in the case of no oﬀshoring. It is easy to verify that an increase
in oﬀshoring, which corresponds to a decrease in α∗, implies increases in Px, wx, wz, θx,θz and a decrease in
Pz.
It follows from (35) and (36) that in order for a firm with productivity α∗ to be indiﬀerent between
oﬀshoring and not oﬀshoring, the following condition must be satisfied
Z =
FV α∗1−σ
(P ∗z )σ [C
∗
V − C
∗
D]
≡ Z(α∗) (39)
where Z(α∗) is the Z required for a firm with productivity α∗ to be exactly indiﬀerent between oﬀshoring
and not oﬀshoring. It is easy to verify that when Z = Z(α∗), ΠV (α) − ΠD(α) > FV for α > α∗ and
ΠV (α)−ΠD(α) < FV for α < α∗. Denote the PzPx when α
∗ > α (i.e., no firm satisfies the cutoﬀ productivity
for oﬀshoring) by pNO and the corresponding price of Z by PNOz , where the superscriptNO is used to capture
the no oﬀshoring case. Note that this is the relative price that obtains in autarky equilibrium. Next, note
that at a price of PNOz , even the most productive firm finds it unprofitable to oﬀshore if ΠV (α)−ΠD(α) < FV ,
or using (39), as long as Z < Z = F
1−σ
V α
1−σ
(PNOz )σ[CNOV −CNOD ]
. Denote the production of X, when the production of Z
equals Z, by X. Since wages and unemployment rates are unchanged as long as p = pNO, lower Z production
is associated with higher X production, and hence Z < Z implies X > X. Therefore, for all Z < Z, ZX <
Z
X ,
and hence no firm oﬀshores as long as ZX <
Z
X .
Denote the PzPx when α
∗ ≤α (i.e., all firms satisfy the cutoﬀ) by pCO and the corresponding price of Z by
PCOz . This price corresponds to the case of complete oﬀshoring and hence the use of superscript CO. Now
in order for all firms to oﬀshore, it must be the case that ΠV (α)−ΠD(α) ≥ FV , which in turn requires from
(39) that Z ≥ Z = FV α
1−σ
(PCOz )σ[CCOV −CCOD ]
. Denote the production of X, when the production of Z equals Z,
by X. Again, at a relative price of pCO any Z > Z implies X < X. Therefore, at a price of PCOz all firms
oﬀshore as long as ZX ≥
Z
X
.
For α∗ ∈ (α, α) it is shown in the appendix that a suﬃcient condition for dZ(α
∗)
dα∗ < 0 is
ωNO >
µ
1
τ
¶ 1
(σ−1)(1−τ)
(40)
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where ωNO (the value of ω at α∗ > α) is the cost of domestic labor relative to foreign labor at autarky
equilibrium.
Intuitively, for a given Z an increase in the number of firms oﬀshoring has two eﬀects on the net profit
from oﬀshoring: an increase in the cost of hiring domestic labor, wz+
(r+δ)cz
q(θz)
, and a decrease in Pz. Whether
an increase in the cost of hiring domestic labor increases or reduces the attractiveness of oﬀshoring depends
on what happens to CV −CD. If CV −CD decreases with oﬀshoring, then Z must increase for more firms to
oﬀshore: Z0(α∗) < 0. Note that CV −CD is the diﬀerence in the profits caused by diﬀering marginal costs in
cases of oﬀshoring and no oﬀshoring. Since oﬀshoring firms also use domestic labor to provide headquarter
services, more oﬀshoring increases the marginal costs of both domestic firms and oﬀshoring firms. Therefore,
due to this eﬀect the profits of both decrease. Since profit is convex in marginal cost (c1−σ), if both marginal
costs (of oﬀshoring and not oﬀshoring) increase proportionately, there would be a greater decline in the profit
from oﬀshoring. Moreover, the decline in profit from oﬀshoring is higher the greater the σ. However, since
oﬀshoring firms use less domestic labor, there is a smaller increase in the marginal cost of oﬀshoring (the
lower the τ the smaller the increase in marginal cost of oﬀshoring). Therefore, the impact of an increase in
domestic labor cost on the net profitability from oﬀshoring is ambiguous. If the net profit from oﬀshoring
either decreases or not increases enough to oﬀset the eﬀect of decrease in Pz, then Z must increase for more
firms to oﬀshore. Condition (40) above is suﬃcient to ensure that Z0(α∗) < 0 which in turn generally implies,
as shown in the appendix, that Z(α
∗)
X(α∗) is decreasing in α
∗ in the range α∗ ∈ (α, α).
In the case when Z0(α∗) > 0, that is when an increase in the hiring cost of domestic labor raises the
net profit from oﬀshoring enough to oﬀset the eﬀect of decrease in Pz, then
Z(α∗)
X(α∗) is increasing in α
∗ in the
range α∗ ∈ (α, α).
2.6.2 Types of Equilibria
Under the suﬃcient condition (40), the Oﬀshoring Curve(OC) looks like the one depicted in Figure 2a. The
equilibrium can be obtained by the intersection of the two curves denoted by RD and OC, since Z and X
are not being traded in the world market. Given the Oﬀshoring Curve in Figure 2a, we have the following
equilibria:
a) Unique equilibrium with no oﬀshoring when the RD curve is one labeled I in Figure 2a.
Allowing oﬀshoring does not change the equilibrium.
b) Unique equilibrium with complete oﬀshoring as depicted in Figure 2a when the RD curve is
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one labeled IV. The intersection of the relative demand curve with the dotted line shows us the
initial equilibrium when oﬀshoring was not allowed. Allowing oﬀshoring moves the economy from
no oﬀshoring to complete oﬀshoring.
c) Multiple equilibria as in Figure 2a when the RD curve is the dotted one labeled II. The initial
no oﬀshoring equilibrium remains an equilibrium even after oﬀshoring. In other words, there is a
coordination problem among firms after oﬀshoring is allowed. A temporary tax break could shift
the economy permanently to the oﬀshoring equilibrium
d) Unique, mixed oﬀshoring equilibrium as in Figure 2a when the RD curve is the one labeled
III. Mixed equilibrium is one where a fraction of firms oﬀshores while others do not. Allowing for
oﬀshoring in this case moves the economy from no oﬀshoring to oﬀshoring by the most productive
firms.9
Since we get multiple equilibria in some cases, a few words on the stability of equilibria are in order.
Note that the Oﬀshoring Curve depicted in Figure 2a is not the standard relative supply curve except in the
extreme cases of no oﬀshoring and complete oﬀshoring. Therefore, we cannot use the standard Marshallian
or Walrasian notions of stability. For each α∗, the conventional relative supply for Z is a horizontal line.
Therefore, we use the following reasonable notion of stability relevant for diﬀerentiated goods producing firms.
In order for an equilibrium to be stable, any unilateral deviation by a small mass of firms, in terms of their
alternative strategies of oﬀshoring or producing their inputs domestically, should result in incentives that
alter firms’ actions (oﬀshoring versus producing domestically) to push the economy back towards that same
(starting) equilibrium outcome. With this definition in mind, look at the interior equilibrium obtained by the
intersection of the dotted RD curve with the OC curve in Figure 2a. Starting from this interior equilibrium,
if a domestic firm oﬀshores (deviates) Pz falls which results in an increase in the relative demand for Z
greater than the required increase in Z/X for an extra firm to oﬀshore. Therefore, more domestic firms have
an incentive to oﬀshore, taking us further away from this interior equilibrium. Hence this equilibrium is not
stable. Using this concept of stability and instability, it can be seen that all the other equilibria in Figure 2a
are stable. In particular the unique, mixed equilibrium obtained by the intersection of the RD curve labeled
9For example, with the following parameters, q(θ) = kθφ−1; k = .25;φ = .5; cx = .05; cz = .05;σ = 3.8;α ∈
Pareto[.2, 3.4];β = .5; b = .25; r = .03; δ = .035; τ = .5; γ = .5;L = 1, we get a unique, mixed equilibrium with FV = 1, ws = .25,
a complete oﬀshoring equilibrium with FV = .5, ws = .25, and a no oﬀshoring equilibrium with FV = 1, ws = .55. The rationale
for choosing these parameter values is provided in the appendix.
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III and the OC curve in Figure 2a is stable.
When Z(α
∗)
X(α∗) is increasing in α
∗, the Oﬀshoring Curve looks like the one shown in Figure 2b. We cannot
get a unique, mixed equilibrium in this case. We get either a no oﬀshoring equilibrium even after allowing
for oﬀshoring, if the RD curve is like the one labeled I in Figure 2b, or a complete oﬀshoring equilibrium
when the RD curve is like the one labeled III in Figure 2b. If the RD curve is like the one labeled II in
Figure 2b, then we get multiple equilibria, however, the argument in the previous paragraph implies that
the interior equilibrium is unstable.
Since the types of equilibria in Figure 2b are a subset of the equilibria depicted in Figure 2a, in the
comparative static analysis below, we focus on the cases depicted in Figure 2a.
2.7 Impact of oﬀshoring on allocation of labor and unemployment
In this section we do two things. First, we study the impacts of decreases in the fixed cost of oﬀshoring,
FV , and transportation/communication cost (or foreign wage), ws. Second, we compare the outcome when
oﬀshoring was not possible to the two cases of mixed equilibrium and complete oﬀshoring equilibrium when
oﬀshoring becomes possible.
2.7.1 Change in the fixed cost of oﬀshoring or in the transportation/communication cost
Suppose there is a decrease in FV . It is easy to verify from the discussion of the Oﬀshoring Curve that it
will shift to the left rendering equilibria with positive amount of oﬀshoring more likely. In Figure 3a the
solid curve is the Oﬀshoring Curve for initial level of FV , while the dashed curve is the Oﬀshoring Curve
after FV has decreased. An implication of the leftward shift of the Oﬀshoring Curve is that even in the case
when the no oﬀshoring equilibrium is the unique equilibrium, as in the case with RD curve I in Figure 2a,
a decrease in FV will make equilibria with positive oﬀshoring more likely. If we start from from a unique,
mixed equilibrium where only a few firms oﬀshore, this reduction in FV will lead to oﬀshoring by more
firms as the equilibrium moves from point A to B in Figure 3a. In both cases the relative price of Z will
fall and that of X will rise, and through the mechanism outlined above we will get a reduction in sectoral
unemployment in each of the two sectors.
A change in transportation, communication cost, or a decrease in Southern wage can be captured by a
decrease in ws in our model. It can be seen from the earlier discussion that Z decreases with ws. As well,
a decrease in ws would imply a lower PCOz and a higher PCOx . Therefore, the relative price pCO at which
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complete oﬀshoring obtains shifts down. A higher PCOx implies higher wCOz and higher θ
CO
z as well. The
impact on Z is as follows. A decrease in ws has a direct negative eﬀect on Z, however, the indirect eﬀects
through changes in wCOz and θ
CO
z are ambiguous. The eﬀects can be seen as follows.
Z =
FV α1−σ
(PCOz )σ
£
CCOV − CCOD
¤
It turns out from the above expression that Z decreases as ws decreases. It can also be verified that for
each p(α∗) ∈ (pCO, pNO), the required ZX is smaller the smaller the ws. Therefore, the Oﬀshoring Curve
shifts to the left as shown in Figure 3b. Again, the possibility of equilibria with oﬀshoring increases, as one
would expect. Also, if we start from from a unique, mixed oﬀshoring equilibrium where only a few firms
oﬀshore, this reduction in ws will lead to oﬀshoring by more firms as the equilibrium moves from point A to
B in Figure 3b. In both these cases the relative price of Z will fall and that of X will rise, and through the
mechanism outlined above we will get a reduction in sectoral unemployment in each of the two sectors.
Thus we can summarize the comparative static results above in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 A decrease in the fixed cost FV of oﬀshoring or in the transportation or communication cost
captured by ws makes an oﬀshoring equilibrium more likely when oﬀshoring is allowed. Also, if we start
from a unique, interior (mixed) equilibrium where only a few firms oﬀshore, this reduction in oﬀshoring or
transportation or communication costs will lead to oﬀshoring by more firms. In both cases the relative price
of Z will fall and that of X will rise, and we will get a reduction in sectoral unemployment in each of the
two sectors.
2.8 Comparing no-oﬀshoring and oﬀshoring equilibria
2.8.1 Sectoral and economywide demand for labor
In an oﬀshoring equilibrium Px is higher, which means wx, θx, wz, and θz are also higher. Since θx and θz
are higher, both ux and uz are lower than in the no-oﬀshoring equilibrium, i.e., the rates of unemployment in
both sectors decrease. An increase in the price of good X is able to support higher labor costs in that sector.
Since the wage bargaining equation implies that wage and market tightness increase together, we have an
increase in both these variables in the X sector. Unemployment goes down as a result. Market tightness in
the X and Z sectors go together, and so we get a reduction in Z sector unemployment rate as well. While
the reduction in Pz by itself, everything else held constant, should increase unemployment in sector Z, this
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is more than oﬀset by the decrease in the cost of production brought about by oﬀshoring. Note that, for
firms that oﬀshore, there is now a higher marginal product of headquarter labor, arising from employment
of more production input per headquarter worker (since the input is now cheaper) in the oﬀshoring firms.
This eﬀect oﬀsets the eﬀect of a decline in the price of Z. An alternative way to look at this is the following.
Oﬀshoring of production activity in one sector makes the other sector relatively more intensive in the use of
domestic labor. At the same time, oﬀshoring raises the relative price of the good whose production is not
oﬀshored, i.e., of the good that is domestic labor intensive. Therefore, cost of domestic labor (wage rate and
market tightness) goes up. This eﬀect is analogous to the Stolper-Samuelson eﬀect.
The impact on aggregate unemployment depends on what happens to Lz, the share of labor aﬃliated
with sector Z, and whether cx is more or less than cz.
Case I: In the special case of cx = cz, we have θx = θz and hence ux = uz. Therefore, aggregate
unemployment falls along with the fall in sectoral unemployment due to oﬀshoring.
When cx = cz, it is easy to show that the size of the labor force in the Z sector post-oﬀshoring is less
than in the pre-oﬀshoring equilibrium (See proof in appendix). Even though the result above obtains for
cx = cz, using a continuity argument we can say that it will hold if cx and cz are not too diﬀerent. Numerical
simulations confirm that the result on Lz decreasing upon oﬀshoring is valid even when cx 6= cz. In this case
we get the following additional results.
Case II: cx < cz. In this case, it is easy to verify that θx > θz, and hence ux < uz. That is, Z sector has
higher wage as well as unemployment. Now, since oﬀshoring shifts labor from sector Z to sector X, there is
going to be an unambiguous decrease in aggregate unemployment. Although the wages of workers in both
sectors increase, the number of workers earning higher wage declines.
Case III: cx > cz. In this case, even though the rate of unemployment decreases in both sectors, since
labor moves into the sector with higher unemployment, the impact on aggregate unemployment is ambiguous.
The comparison of the oﬀshoring and no-oﬀshoring equilibria can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 2 In an oﬀshoring equilibrium, sectoral wages are higher and sectoral unemployment lower
than in the pre- or no-oﬀshoring equilibrium. When cx ≤ cz, there is an unambiguous decrease in aggregate
unemployment as a result of moving from a no- (or pre-) oﬀshoring equilibrium to an oﬀshoring equilibrium.
When cx > cz, the impact on aggregate unemployment is ambiguous.
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2.8.2 Firm-level demand for labor
In the model, the reallocation of labor, as a result of oﬀshoring, can be summarized as follows. Firstly, there
is intersectoral reallocation of labor from sector Z to sector X. Secondly, within sector Z some or all firms
move some of their production activities overseas. Thirdly, within that sector demand for labor shifts to
headquarter services in firms that end up oﬀshoring their production. Finally, since foreign labor is cheaper,
oﬀshoring firms will increase the use of production services and depending on the elasticity of substitution,
decrease or increase the use of headquarter services.
To see the impact of oﬀshoring on employment for an individual firm we need to do the following. Let
us look at the marginal firm, α∗ that is indiﬀerent between oﬀshoring and no oﬀshoring. If this firm doesn’t
oﬀshore then its employment is given by
NNO(α∗) =
z(α∗)
α∗
=
µ
p(α∗)
Pz
¶−σ Z
α∗
=
µ
σ
σ − 1
¶−σ
α∗σ−1
µ
wz +
(r + δ)cz
q(θz)
¶−σ
ZPσz
Similarly, the domestic employment of this firm, if it decides to oﬀshore is given by
NO(α∗) =
τz(α∗)
α∗
ωτ−1 =
µ
p(α∗)
Pz
¶−σ τZωτ−1
α∗
=
µ
σ
σ − 1
¶−σ
α∗σ−1
µ
wz +
(r + δ)cz
q(θz)
¶−σ
τZPσz ω
(1−τ)(σ−1)
Comparing the above two expressions, note that NO(α∗) > NNO(α∗), under the suﬃcient condition ω
NO
>¡
1
τ
¢ 1
(σ−1)(1−τ) discussed earlier.
Intuitively, a high τ implies greater headquarter intensity, and therefore, employment of oﬀshoring firms
can increase because their headquarter activities increase (due to their complementarity with labor used in
production). A high ω means a higher relative labor cost in the North relative to the South, which means
that oﬀshoring firms steal more business from non-oﬀshoring firms. Therefore, their domestic employment
can increase. Finally, a high σ implies greater elasticity of substitution, and therefore, oﬀshoring firms again
can steal more business from non-oﬀshoring firms. Thus, if the business stealing eﬀect is suﬃciently strong,
the domestic employment of oﬀshoring firms can be higher than that of non-oﬀshoring firms.
To compare domestic employment of a firm before and after oﬀshoring we need to compare
τω(1−τ)(σ−1)
µ
wOz +
(r + δ)cz
q(θOz )
¶−σ
ZO
¡
POz
¢σ
>
µ
wNOz +
(r + δ)cz
q(θNOz )
¶−σ
ZNO
¡
PNOz
¢σ
There are several eﬀects. ω(1−τ)(σ−1) captures the business stealing eﬀect as discussed earlier. However,
domestically produced inputs have become costlier due to the higher domestic wage compared to the no
oﬀshoring case. This increase in the price of domestic inputs would tend to reduce domestic employment. In
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addition, what happens to ZPσz becomes important. An increase in this implies an increase in employment
for all firms in the industry. Therefore, the net eﬀect depends on the relative strengths of these eﬀects.
The above discussion on firm-level employment can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 For high enough headquarter intensity τ , a high enough ω, the relative North-South labor cost
and for a high enough elasticity of substitution σ , an oﬀshoring firm, controlling for firm-level characteristics,
will have higher domestic employment relative to that of a firm which remains fully domestic. Similar
variables determine, albeit in a much more complicated manner, whether a firm after oﬀshoring increases its
domestic employment or not.
2.9 Other Comparative Static Exercises
While the focus of this paper is to understand the implications of oﬀshoring for unemployment, we can also use
the model to understand how labor market institutions aﬀect oﬀshoring and consequently unemployment. To
this end, we study the impact of an increase in the unemployment benefit, b, on oﬀshoring and unemployment.
We will also look at the impact of a change in the country size, L.
When b goes up, holding cz = cx, the average cost of employing domestic labor in each sector, given
by
³
wi +
(r+δ)ci
q(θi)
´
, i = x, z, remains unchanged for a given Px. Therefore, holding the number of firms
oﬀshoring fixed, from the production side Pz does not change due to this increase in b at a given Px . It
also means that the threshold Z consistent with just making exactly as many firms oﬀshore remains the
same. However, an increase in b at given Px (and therefore, at given Pz) reduces labor market tightness
and increases unemployment in both sectors. Therefore, even though the threshold Z remains unchanged
we now have a higher threshold Z/X. The oﬀshoring curve shifts right from OC to OC’ as a result of the
increase in b (Figure 3c). Starting from an initial mixed equilibrium A, we move to B which corresponds to a
mixed equilibrium with oﬀshoring by fewer firms and a higher relative price of Z. On top of the direct eﬀect
of an increase in b on unemployment, there is a further indirect adverse eﬀect on unemployment through
the reduction in Px. Intuitively, at unchanged Px, an increase in b increases wage but reduces the market
tightness. While the former raises the domestic labor cost, the latter reduces it and oﬀsets the eﬀect of
the former. A reduction in Px reduces domestic labor cost, making oﬀshoring less attractive. Therefore, an
increase in b aﬀects oﬀshoring adversely through intersectoral price changes. Eﬀectively, an increase in the
unemployment benefit works like a reduction in country size. This in turn leads to fewer firms being able to
jump the fixed costs of oﬀshoring.
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A comparative static exercise of directly reducing country size, L will give us similar eﬀects in terms
of shifting the oﬀshoring curve, the fall in Px and the consequent rise in unemployment (only the indirect
eﬀect).
3 The Case of No Intersectoral Labor Mobility
Since studying the transitional dynamics of the model is very complicated, to study the shorter run implica-
tions of oﬀshoring on unemployment, we discuss a case where there is no intersectoral labor mobility. The
only connection between the two sectors is through goods prices.
We know that since the composite good C is the numeraire good and its price equals unity, Px and Pz
move in opposite directions. Also, when PzPx rises, it means Px falls and Pz rises. With no intersectoral labor
mobility, i.e., with Lx and Lz held fixed, we need to solve the wage and price equations simultaneously within
a sector but separately for the two sectors. Clearly the solution to the equations wx = (1−β)b+β[Px+cxθx],
Px = wx+
(r+δ)cx
q(θx)
will be such that as Px goes down (as PzPx rises) both wx and θx fall. A fall in θx, plugged
into the Beveridge curve, implies that sectoral unemployment rate ux rises. However, as Pz goes up (as PzPx
rises), the solution to the simultaneous equations wz = b + βcz1−β [θz +
r+δ
q(θz)
], Pz = σσ−1
³
wz +
(r+δ)cz
q(θz)
´ eα−1,
that hold under autarky, is such that both wz and θz rise. Plugging this rise in θz into the Beveridge curve,
we get a decline in the sectoral unemployment uz. Thus, under autarky, for given Lx and Lz, as PzPx rises,
Z
X rises. Let us call this relationship, the short-run relative supply curve, and the horizontal relative supply
curve we derived earlier, shown in Figure 1, the long-run relative supply curve. At Lx = LNOx and Lz = LNOz
(where LNOi represents equilibrium labor force in sector i = x, z, in autarky when labor is mobile across
sectors) it is easy to see that both the long-run and the short-run curves cut the relative demand curve at
exactly the same point A (See Figure 4 where SRS stands for short-run relative supply).
Let us now look at a situation of complete oﬀshoring equilibrium under no intersectoral labor mobility and
compare it with the scenario of labor mobility.10 The condition Pz = σσ−1
³
wz +
(r+δ)cz
q(θz)
´ eα−1 under autarky
now gets replaced with Pz = σσ−1
³
wz +
(r+δ)cz
q(θz)
´
ω(τ−1)eα−1 under complete oﬀshoring where ω(τ−1) < 1. As
in the case of autarky, the short-run supply curve under complete oﬀshoring is again upward sloping. As seen
in Figure 4, the long-run complete oﬀshoring equilibrium is also a short-run complete oﬀshoring equilibrium
at Lx = LCOx and Lz = LCOz (where LCOi represents equilibrium labor force in sector i = x, z, under
10Note that at this moment complete oﬀshoring is being taken as given. This can be guaranteed for fixed costs of oﬀshoring
small enough.
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complete oﬀshoring when labor is mobile across sectors).
Holding the economy’s labor force constant, increasing Lz shifts the short-run relative supply curve to the
right. For small enough fixed costs of oﬀshoring, allowing the possibility of oﬀshoring will give us complete
oﬀshoring under both intersectoral labor mobility and no labor mobility. At Lx = LNOx and Lz = LNOz
(allowing no labor mobility), the short-run relative supply curve under complete oﬀshoring should now be
to the right of the one at Lx = LCOx and Lz = LCOz , since, as shown in the appendix, LCOx < LNOz . Thus,
Pz
Px
under complete oﬀshoring is lower when there is no labor mobility than under labor mobility. Therefore,
under complete oﬀshoring Z sector wages are lower and unemployment there higher under no labor mobility
than under labor mobility. Under both labor mobility and no labor mobility, there are two eﬀects of oﬀshoring
on sector Z. One is the cost-reducing or the productivity-enhancing eﬀect, while the other is the decline in
relative price (a fall in PzPx ). The second eﬀect is stronger under no labor mobility than under mobile labor
and if this eﬀect is strong enough, the sectoral unemployment rate may go up in the Z sector. Whether
this will be the case or not will depend on parameter γ which represents the importance of Z in the final
numeraire good C and headquarter intensity τ . Intuitively, a higher γ implies a higher demand for Z sector
output and consequently a higher derived demand for labor in the Z sector, while a higher τ implies higher
demand for domestic labor in sector Z. Therefore, with a high γ or τ , a larger amount of labor can be
absorbed in the Z sector without a rise in unemployment.
Also the favorable terms-of-trade eﬀect of oﬀshoring for the X sector is stronger under no labor mobility
than under mobile labor. Therefore, the reduction in the unemployment rate in the X sector (due to
oﬀshoring) is greater in the short-run than in the long run. This means unemployment falls by a considerable
amount in the short run and then rises in the long run, with the new long run unemployment rate being
lower than the initial long-run unemployment rate.
In the case of incomplete oﬀshoring, when only the most productive firms are able to jump the fixed costs
of oﬀshoring, there are several more eﬀects we need to take care of. Firstly, the labor force in the Z sector
is larger in size under no labor mobility which shifts, as in the complete oﬀshoring case, the relative supply
curve to the right. Second, the equilibrium number of firms oﬀshoring also aﬀects this curve. There are two
factors acting in opposite directions on the equilibrium number of firms oﬀshoring. Under no labor mobility
(relative to the mobile labor case), wages and labor-market tightness are lower in the Z sector in the North,
which reduces the attractiveness of oﬀshoring. However, since the labor force is not allowed to shrink in
this sector, the scale eﬀect (captured by PzZ) and hence the attractiveness of oﬀshoring are stronger when
labor mobility is not allowed than when it is allowed. The impact of oﬀshoring on sectoral unemployment
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rates is qualitatively similar to that in the complete oﬀshoring case. Below we provide numerical examples
to confirm that unemployment can go down in the Z sector starting from an initial situation of a mixed
oﬀshoring equilibrium.
Table 1
Labor Parameters PzPx α
∗ G(α∗) wx wz ω ux uz Lz
mobility
I FV = 1, ws = .25 2.44 0.24 0.46 .606 .606 2.56 .0521 .05214 .276
II Yes FV = .75, ws = .25 2.39 0.218 0.26 .613 .613 2.59 .0517 .0517 .272
III NO FV = .75, ws = .25 2.36 0.219 0.26 .617 .606 2.56 .0514 .05215 .276
IV Yes FV = 1, ws = .2 2.08 0.225 0.33 .658 .658 3.47 .0488 .0488 .272
V NO FV = 1, ws = .2 2.05 0.225 0.33 .662 .650 3.42 .0485 .0493 .276
The other parameter are as follows. q(θ) = kθφ−1; k = .25;φ = .5; cx = .05; cz = .05;σ = 3.8;α ∈
Pareto[.2, 3.4];β = .5; b = .25; r = .03; δ = .035; τ = .5; γ = .5;L = 1. We discuss the rationale for choosing
these parameter values in the appendix.
Row I presents the results of the initial mixed oﬀshoring equilibrium. Rows II and III present results of
a 25% reduction in the fixed cost of oﬀshoring FV with and without labor mobility, respectively. Comparing
rows I and II, we see that reduction in FV leads to increased oﬀshoring and decreases in unemployment
rates in both sectors when there is labor mobility. When the amount of labor in the Z sector is restricted
to that in row I, then oﬀshoring reduces unemployment in X sector but increases it slightly in the Z sector.
In rows IV and V FV goes back to 1, but ws is lowered by 20% compared to row I. Again there is increased
oﬀshoring both with and without labor mobility, however, in this case even in the absence of labor mobility,
the unemployment rates in both sectors go down as shown in row V, even though the decline is larger in
sector X.
Proposition 4 In the shorter run case where intersectoral labor mobility is not allowed, in an oﬀshoring
equilibrium, the reduction in the relative price of Z is greater than what we get with oﬀshoring under in-
tersectoral labor mobility. Thus, the increase in wage and the reduction in sectoral unemployment in sector
Z under oﬀshoring are smaller under no labor mobility than under intersectoral labor mobility , with the
possibility being there that sectoral unemployment goes up as a result. In the X sector, the increase in wage
and the reduction in sectoral unemployment as a result of oﬀshoring are greater.
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4 An Extension: Free Entry
The extension we present here is allowing for free entry of firms in the diﬀerentiated inputs sector, so that
the mass of firms operating in equilibrium is endogenously determined.11 We are back here to the case of
intersectoral labor mobility. As discussed in section 2, before entering, firms incur a sunk cost equal to FE
in terms of the numeraire good. Then they observe their realization of productivity which they draw from
a distribution G(α), where α ∈ [α, α]. The price of Z, Pz, can now be written as
Pz =M
1
1−σ
⎡
⎣
αZ
α
p(α)1−σdG(α)
⎤
⎦
1
1−σ
(41)
where M is the mass of active firms. Assuming α∗ to be the cutoﬀ productivity above which firms oﬀshore,
the key equations determining the equilibrium in the case of endogenous entry are given as follows. The
pricing decision of diﬀerentiated goods firms is same as before. The equation determining cutoﬀ productivity
α∗ is again given by (37) which can be written as
ZPσz (α
∗)σ−1(CV − CD) = FV (42)
The only additional equation is the free entry condition in the diﬀerentiated goods sector which can be
written as
ZPσz
⎡
⎣CV
α∗Z
α
ασ−1dG(α) + CD
αZ
α∗
ασ−1dG(α)
⎤
⎦ = FE + (1−G(α∗))FV (43)
The labor market clearing condition in the Z sector is modified as follows.
(1− uz)Lz =MZ
µ
σ
(σ − 1)
¶−σ µ
wz +
(r + δ)cz
q(θz)
¶−σ ⎡
⎣
α∗Z
α
ασ−1dG(α) + τω(σ−1)(1−τ)
αZ
α∗
ασ−1dG(α)
⎤
⎦ (44)
The product market clearing condition is still given by
Z
(1− ux)(L− Lz)
=
γ (Pz)
1
γ−1
(1− γ) (45)
Equations (41)-(45) along with (60)-(66) in the appendix determine the following 12 endogenous variables
of interest:Px, Pz, wx, wz, θx,θz, ux, uz, Lz, Z, α∗, and M.
11 See Ziesemer (2005) for a completely autarkic, one sector model of unemployment under monopolistic competition.
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Next, we show that the results obtained on the impact of oﬀshoring on unemployment continue to hold
when the number of varieties is endogenously determined. Establishing this result analytically in the general
case is diﬃcult, therefore, we look at the case where cx = cz. In equilibrium, a potential entrant must be
indiﬀerent between entering and not entering an industry. Let π be the expected annualized per period
profit of a potential new entrant in the diﬀerentiated intermediate good sector when the economy is in the
steady state. This profit is net of both search and production costs, but gross of fixed costs and is given by
r times the expression on the left hand side of (43) Since we have cx = cz = ce, we have wx = wz = we,
θx = θz = θe, and ux = uz = ue, where the subscript e denotes “economywide”. Let R be the annualized
per period expected revenue of a potential new entrant. Given the markup equation we derived earlier, we
have π = R/σ. Since C = Z
γX1−γ
γγ(1−γ)1−γ , a constant share γ of total expenditure (by final consumers and by
firms) on C is indirectly on the Z good and consequently on all the intermediate varieties, z(i) combined.
Total expenditure on the numeraire good C is the sum of the wage bill, total profits net of fixed costs, search
costs and total fixed costs. As explained earlier, incumbent firms already in the steady state will earn rents
relative to a potential new entrant. Such rents will be earned by incumbent firms in both sectors because
each occupied job have a value of ceq(θe) . Let us denote total per-period rents of this type by Γ.
12 Also, in our
framework, when a firm incurs a sunk cost of entry, FE , right in the beginning, it is equivalent to paying rFE
every period. Recall that rFV is the per period fixed cost of oﬀshoring. With a total of M firms producing
the diﬀerentiated intermediate good z we have total revenue in the intermediate goods sector sector equal
to total expenditure, Ez, on Z
MR = Ez = γ{(1− ue)weL+M [π − (1−G(α∗))rFV − rFE ] + Γ+ S +M [(1−G(α∗))rFV + rFE ]} (46)
where S is the total search costs incurred by all firms in the economy and is given in steady state by δce(1−ue)Lq(θe) .
In equilibrium with M endogenously determined, the free entry condition in (43) can be re-written as
π = (1−G(α∗))rFV + rFE (47)
using which and using the relation π = R/σ, we have the equilibrium condition given by
σ [(1−G(α∗))rFV + rFE ] =
1
M
γ {(1− ue)weL+ Γ+ S +M [(1−G(α∗))rFV + rFE ]} (48)
12The total annualized rents per period for the economy as a whole can be written as Γ = rce(1−ue)Lq(θe) where as before the
subscript e stands for the common, economywide variable.
27
The above can be re-written as
[(1−G(α∗))rFV + rFE ] =
γ
(σ − γ)M {(1− ue)weL+ Γ+ S} (49)
which can be further re-written as
[(1−G(α∗))rFV + rFE ] =
γ
(σ − γ)M (we +
(r + δ)ce
q(θe)
) (1− ue)L (50)
Now, for a given α∗, we and θe are increasing in M, while ue is decreasing in M. Therefore, the numerator
of the r.h.s of the above expression is clearly increasing in M. In the case of autarky, which equals the case
where α∗ = α, it is shown in the appendix that the proportional change in (we +
(r+δ)ce
q(θe)
) is less than the
proportional change inM, and since the impact on ue is of second order, the r.h.s above, which we from now
on call ϕ(M), would be decreasing in M in autarky. It is shown in the appendix that under the suﬃcient
condition (σ − 1) > γ(1−γ(1−τ)) , (we +
(r+δ)ce
q(θe)
) under oﬀshoring increases less than proportionally with M
for any α∗. With the impact on ue being second order once again, ϕ(M) is decreasing with M also in the
oﬀshoring case.13 Therefore the ϕ(M), is represented by a downward sloping EE curve in Figure 5.
When FV is small, for a given M, allowing for oﬀshoring leads to complete oﬀshoring, i.e., α∗ = α at
which point G(α∗) = 0. We now look at the various components of ϕ(M) under complete oﬀshoring and
under autarky. For a given M , we and θe are decreasing in α∗, while ue is increasing in α∗. Therefore,
(we +
(r+δ)ce
q(θe)
) (1− ue)L is higher under oﬀshoring than under autarky. The per-firm total costs of entry
and oﬀshoring combined are greater under complete oﬀshoring than under no oﬀshoring. In Figure 5, the
EE curve under complete oﬀshoring lies above the one under no oﬀshoring. If FV is relatively small, we
clearly have equilibrium M , given by the intersection of EE and the per firm fixed cost curve, higher under
complete oﬀshoring than under no oﬀshoring. This also implies that Pz is lower with endogenous M than
with exogenous M, and hence unemployment is lower in a complete oﬀshoring equilibrium with endogenous
M than with exogenous M.
Thus, with free entry, we have an increase in the total mass of firms operating in the diﬀerentiated
intermediate goods sector as a result of oﬀshoring. This, clearly, is an additional channel through which
oﬀshoring increases the wage rate and reduces unemployment, since this eﬀect increases productivity in
the Z sector and thereby increases the relative price of X. While the analysis in this section sharpens our
13 It is easy to check that ϕ(M) → 0 as M → ∞ and ϕ(M) → ∞ as M → 0 under autarky as well under the condition
(σ− 1) > γ
(1−γ(1−τ)) we have imposed under oﬀshoring. Assuming ϕ(M) is continuous in M, these extreme values confirm the
existence of a stable, interior equilibrium value of M for any positive value of fixed costs.
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understanding of the free entry case and guides us on how to think about it, it requires making the restriction
of relatively small fixed costs of oﬀshoring (that leads to complete oﬀshoring). Free entry in the incomplete
oﬀshoring case (the case with larger fixed costs) is analytically intractable, especially since both M and α∗
are endogenously determined and they together determine the unemployment rate. Therefore, we construct
some numerical examples of incomplete oﬀshoring (mixed equilibrium) to check the robustness of our insights
from our above analysis of the complete oﬀshoring case.
Numerical Examples : The movement to greater oﬀshoring here is a result of a reduction in FV .
Oﬀshoring leads to greater decrease in unemployment in the case of endogenous entry. The table below
provides numerical examples to show the impact of decreases in FV and ws in the cases of no entry and free
entry.
Table 2
Free entry PzPx α
∗ G(α∗) w ω u Lz M
I FV = 1, ws = .25 2.44 0.24 0.46 .606 2.56 .0521 .28 1
II FV = .75, ws = .25 No 2.39 0.218 0.26 .613 2.59 .0517 .27 1
III FV = .75, ws = .25 Yes 2.37 0.219 0.27 .615 2.6 .0515 .27 1.02
IV FV = 1, ws = .2 No 2.08 0.225 0.33 .658 3.47 .0488 .27 1
V FV = 1, ws = .2 Yes 2.01 0.229 0.36 .669 3.53 .0482 .27 1.08
The other parameters are same as in the numerical examples presented in Table 1.
The first row gives the results of the initial mixed equilibrium with the entry cost chosen to makeM = 1.
The required entry cost turns out to be FE = 3.31. The second row shows results of lowering FV with no entry
while the third row shows results with free entry. Rows IV and V show the results of lowering ws from .25 in
row I to .2 while keeping FV at the same level as in row I. The results above make it clear that allowing for
entry makes the unemployment reducing eﬀect of oﬀshoring stronger, but the eﬀect is quantitatively small.
5 Discussions and Conclusions
In this paper, in order to study the impact of oﬀshoring on sectoral and economywide rates of unemployment,
we construct a two sector general equilibrium model in which unemployment is caused by search frictions.
We find that, contrary to general perception, wage increases and sectoral unemployment decreases due to
oﬀshoring. This result can be understood to arise from the productivity enhancing (cost reducing) eﬀect of
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oﬀshoring. This result is consistent with the recent empirical results of Amiti and Wei (2005a, b) for the
US and UK, where, when sectors are defined broadly enough, they find no evidence of a negative eﬀect of
oﬀshoring on sectoral employment.
Even though both sectors have lower unemployment post-oﬀshoring, whether the sector with the lower
unemployment or higher unemployment expands will also be a determinant of the overall unemployment
rate. If the search cost is identical in the two sectors, implying identical rates of unemployment, then the
economywide rate of unemployment declines unambiguously after oﬀshoring. Alternatively, even if the search
cost is higher in the sector which experiences oﬀshoring (implying a higher wage as well as higher rate of
unemployment in that sector), the economywide rate of unemployment decreases because workers move from
the higher unemployment sector to the lower unemployment sector. Interestingly, when the possibility of
oﬀshoring is allowed for we find the existence of multiple equilibria, resulting in the indeterminacy of sectoral
and overall unemployment rates.
Next, the domestic employment of firms that oﬀshore may be higher than those of firms that decide not
to oﬀshore. This arises from the complementarity between headquarter services and production that can
be oﬀshored, as well as from the business stealing eﬀect. These eﬀects can also increase a firm’s domestic
employment after oﬀshoring relative to its pre-oﬀshoring level.
When we modify the model to disallow intersectoral labor mobility, the negative relative price eﬀect on
the sector in which firms oﬀshore some of their production activity becomes stronger. In such a case, it is
possible for this eﬀect to oﬀset the positive productivity eﬀect, and result in a rise in unemployment in that
sector. In the other sector, oﬀshoring has a much stronger unemployment reducing eﬀect in the absence of
intersectoral labor mobility than in the presence of it.
Finally, allowing for an endogenous number varieties in the oﬀshoring sector provides an additional
indirect channel through which sectoral unemployment goes down.
Before ending the paper some remarks on some of our modeling assumptions are in order. Instead of
writing a two sector model, we could have written a one sector model to examine the impact of oﬀshoring
on unemployment. We have verified that the unemployment reducing eﬀect of oﬀshoring is present even in
a one sector model with endogenous entry a la Melitz (2003), but we preferred a two sector model because
it provides additional insights about the intersectoral reallocation. We have modeled vacancy cost, c, in
terms of the numeraire good which seemed natural given the two sector structure of the model. One could
alternatively model the vacancy cost either in terms of labor or foregone output. In the former case, the
vacancy cost would be ciwi for sector i = X,Z, where wi is the sectoral wage. In the latter case, it would
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be cipi. Our preliminary investigation suggests that the qualitative results would be unchanged.
The model in the paper can be extended along several dimensions. In our current paper we do not
explicitly model outsourcing, as is currently understood to be subject to contracting problems.14 If firms
have the choice to outsource their production activities to a foreign supplier in an incomplete contract
framework, whether a firm outsources or produces inputs domestically will depend on the tradeoﬀ between
the domestic labor market frictions and contracting costs.
Another possible extension would be to endogenize the bargaining power of workers in the wage bargaining
process. In our current model, wages increase with oﬀshoring, however, there is some evidence to suggest
that wages of workers have stagnated despite productivity gains coming from globalization and technological
progress. If we make workers’ bargaining power a decreasing function of the number of firms oﬀshoring, it
would be possible to show a decrease in wages resulting from oﬀshoring. This would be similar in spirit to
the Mitchell (1985) description of “norm shift” in wage determination. Since our focus in the present paper
is on unemployment eﬀects of oﬀshoring, we do not pursue this extension in the present paper.
We can also extend the model to allow for workers with diﬀerent skills and see whether oﬀshoring aﬀects
them diﬀerentially. We plan to pursue these extensions in a separate paper, as they seem to be beyond the
scope of the current one.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Maximization problem of the firm in the no oﬀshoring case
The firm maximizes (15) subject to (14), (9), and (13). Denoting the Lagrangian multiplier associated with
(14) by λ, with (9) by ξ, and with (13) by φ, the current value Hamiltonian for each firm can be written as
H = p(α)z(α)− w(α)N(α)− czV (α) + λ[q(θz)V (α)− δN(α)]
+ξ[
1
ττ (1− τ)1−τ αmh(α)
τmp(α)1−τ − z(α)] + φ[N(α)−mh(α)−mp(α)]
The first order conditions for the above maximization are follows.
z(α) : p(α) + z(α)(dp(α)/dz(α)) = ξ (51)
mh :
ξγα(α)mh(α)τ−1mp(α)1−τ
ττ (1− τ)1−τ = φ (52)
mp :
ξ(1− τ)αmh(α)τmp(α)−τ
τ τ (1− τ)1−τ = φ (53)
V (α) : cz = λq(θz) (54)
N(α) : w(α) + λδ − φ =
.
λ− rλ (55)
Now, (52) and (53) imply
mh(α)
mp(α)
=
τ
1− τ (56)
using the above in (52) gives
ξ =
φ
α
(57)
Next, note from (54) that for a given θz, λ is constant. Using
.
λ = 0 in (55) we get
φ− w(α) = (r + δ)λ (58)
Denoting the elasticity of demand facing each producer by σ,from (51) (57) and (58) we get
σ−1
σ αp(α)− w(α)
(r + δ)
= λ =
cz
q(θz)
(59)
λ is the shadow value of an extra job.
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6.2 Derivation of Expression for Present Discounted Value of Profits
The present discounted value of a firm’s profit at time t is given byZ ∞
t
e−r(s−t){ps(α)zs(α)− ws(α)Ns(α)− czVs(α)}ds
Next, substitute out Vs(α) using
.
Ns(α) = q(θz)Vs(α)− δNs(α) to getZ ∞
t
e−r(s−t){ps(α)zs(α)−
µ
ws(α) +
δcz
q(θz)
¶
Ns(α)−
cz
q(θz)
.
Ns(α)}ds
We know that w(α) = wz. Also, if the industry is in steady-state at time t, then wz, θz, Pz, and Z do not
change over time and are taken as given by a firm. Since the economy is in steady state and so Z, θ and λ
are fixed, and because adjustment costs are linear, a firm with employment Nt at time t will immediately
jump to the steady state level of employment and output. Incorporating all this, after integrating the last
term of the previous expression by parts, we obtain the present discounted value of a firm’s profit at time t
as Z ∞
t
e−r(s−t){p(α)z(α)−
µ
wz +
(r + δ)cz
q(θz)
¶
N(α)}ds+ cz
q(θz)
Nt(α)
where the variables without time subscripts denote steady state values. Next, use N(α) = z(α)α and the the
first order condition given in (17) to write the present discounted value of profit of a firm with employment
Nt(α) at time t as
z(α)p(α)
rσ +
cz
q(θz)
Nt(α). Finally, using (12) the above can be written as
ZPσz
rσσ(σ − 1)1−σ
µ
wz +
(r + δ)cz
q(θz)
¶1−σ
ασ−1 +
cz
q(θz)
Nt(α)
6.3 Equations determining equilibrium in the oﬀshoring case
Px = (Pz)
γ
γ−1 (60)
wx = (1− β)b+ β[Px + cxθx] (61)
Px = wx +
(r + δ)cx
q(θx)
(62)
ux =
δ
δ + θxq(θx)
(63)
czθz = cxθx (64)
wz = b+
βcz
1− β [θz +
r + δ
q(θz)
] (65)
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uz =
δ
δ + θzq(θz)
(66)
Pz =
σ
σ − 1
µ
wz +
(r + δ)cz
q(θz)
¶⎡
⎣
α∗Z
α
ασ−1dG(α) + ω(σ−1)(1−τ)
αZ
α∗
ασ−1dG(α)
⎤
⎦
1
1−σ
(67)
ΠV (α∗)−ΠD(α∗) = FV (68)
The above 9 equations correspond to equations (3), (26), (27), (28), (29), (24), (19), (37), respectively,
in the text.
The total employment in the Z sector denoted by NZ can be written as
NZ = (1− uz)Lz =
1Z
α
N(α)dG(α) =
α∗Z
α
z(α)
α
dG(α) + τωτ−1
α∗Z
α
z(α)
α
Using the demand functions in (6), the above can be written as
(1−uz)Lz = Z
⎡
⎣
α∗Z
α
ασ−1dG(α) + ω(σ−1)(1−τ)
αZ
α∗
ασ−1dG(α)
⎤
⎦
σ
1−σ ⎡
⎣
α∗Z
α
ασ−1dG(α) + τω(σ−1)(1−τ)
αZ
α∗
ασ−1dG(α)
⎤
⎦
(69)
Next, X = (1− ux)Lx, and relative demand
¡ Z
X
¢
is a function of Pz together imply
(1− uz)Lz
(1− ux)(L− Lz)
(70)
=
γ (Pz)
1
γ−1
(1− γ)
⎡
⎣
α∗Z
α
ασ−1dG(α) + ω(σ−1)(1−τ)
αZ
α∗
ασ−1dG(α)
⎤
⎦
σ
1−σ ⎡
⎣
α∗Z
α
ασ−1dG(α) + τω(σ−1)(1−τ)
αZ
α∗
ασ−1dG(α)
⎤
⎦
The 11 equations (60)-(68), (69) and (70) determine the following endogenous variables:
Px, Pz, wx, wz, θx,θz, ux, uz, Lz, Z, α∗.
6.4 Shape of Oﬀshoring Curve
As mentioned in the text, for each α∗, Px, Pz, wx, wz, θx,θz, are determined irrespective of the demand
condition.
Recall from equation (39) in the text that the condition for a firm with productivity α∗ to be indiﬀerent
between oﬀshoring and not oﬀshoring is
Z =
FV α∗1−σ
(P ∗z )σ [C
∗
V − C
∗
D]
≡ Z(α∗) (71)
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Our aim is to find out what happens to the minimum required Z when α∗ is lowered. As mentioned in the
text, a decrease in α∗ implies increases in Px, wx, wz, θx,θz and a decrease in Pz. Therefore, a suﬃcient, but
by no means necessary, condition for Z0(α∗) < 0 is that CV − CD is increasing in α∗. Note that
CV − CD ≡
³
wz +
(r+δ)cz
q(θz)
´1−σ ¡
ω(σ−1)(1−τ) − 1
¢
rσσ(σ − 1)1−σ
Therefore,
d log(CV − CD)
dα∗
= (1− σ)
d log
³
wz +
(r+δ)cz
q(θz)
´
dα∗
+
d log
¡
ω(σ−1)(1−τ) − 1
¢
dα∗
which can be re-written as
d log(CV − CD)
dα∗
=
d log
³
wz +
(r+δ)cz
q(θz)
´
(σ − 1)
dα∗
"
1− τω(σ−1)(1−τ)¡
ω(σ−1)(1−τ) − 1
¢#
Since wz and θz are decreasing in α∗,
d log(wz+ (r+δ)czq(θz) )
dα∗ < 0, and hence,
d log(CV−CD)
dα∗ > 0 iﬀ
ω >
µ
1
τ
¶ 1
(σ−1)(1−τ)
(72)
It can be seen that the term on the rhs of (72) is decreasing in σ and τ . Therefore, (72) is easily satisfied
for high σ and τ . Also, since wz and θz are decreasing in α∗, a suﬃcient condition for Z0(α∗) < 0 is
ωNO >
¡
1
τ
¢ 1
(σ−1)(1−τ) . (Recall that ω∗ > ωNO ∀α∗ ≥ α).
Since we want to plot the oﬀshoring curve in ( ZX ,
Pz
Px
) space, we want to establish that Z0(α∗) < 0 implies
Z(α∗)
X(α∗) is also decreasing in α
∗. Define ψ(α∗) ≡ Z(α
∗)
X(α∗) . Using (69) write the relationship between output and
employment in the Z sector as
Z(α∗) = A(α∗)(1− uz(α∗))Lz(α∗) (73)
where
A(α∗) =
⎡
⎣
α∗Z
α
ασ−1dG(α) + ω(σ−1)(1−τ)
αZ
α∗
ασ−1dG(α)
⎤
⎦
σ
σ−1 ⎡
⎣
α∗Z
α
ασ−1dG(α) + τω(σ−1)(1−τ)
αZ
α∗
ασ−1dG(α)
⎤
⎦
−1
(74)
Z0(α∗) < 0 implies d lnA(α
∗)
dα∗ +
d ln(1−uz(α∗))
dα∗ +
d lnLz(α∗)
dα∗ < 0. Since
d ln(1−uz(α∗))
dα∗ is, relative to the other terms,
a second-order eﬀect, we take d ln(1−uz(α
∗))
dα∗ ≈ 0, and so eﬀectively, Z0(α∗) < 0 implies −
d lnA(α∗)
dα∗ >
d lnLZ
dα∗ .
Next, ψ(α∗) = A(α
∗)Lz(α∗)
L−Lz(α∗) if cx = cz.Therefore, we have
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d lnψ(α∗)
dα∗
=
d lnA(α∗)
dα∗
+
d lnLz(α∗)
dα∗
+
Lz(α∗)
L− Lz(α∗)
d lnLz(α∗)
dα∗
=
d lnA(α∗)
dα∗
+
1
lx
d lnLz(α∗)
dα∗
(75)
where lx = (L−Lz(α∗))/L. Therefore, d lnψ(α
∗)
dα∗ < 0 when
1
lx
d lnLz(α∗)
dα∗ < −
d lnA(α∗)
dα∗ .We discuss two possible
cases.
Case I: d lnLz(α
∗)
dα∗ < 0. In this case
d lnLz(α∗)
dα∗ >
1
lx
d lnLz(α∗)
dα∗ . Therefore, Z
0(α∗) < 0 implies
1
lx
d lnLz(α∗)
dα∗ <
−d lnA(α
∗)
dα∗ .
Case II: d lnLz(α
∗)
dα∗ > 0. In this case Z
0(α∗) < 0 implies −d lnA(α
∗)
dα∗ > 0. So, for
d lnψ(α∗)
dα∗ < 0 we need
lx >
³
d lnLz(α∗)
dα∗
´
/
³
−d lnA(α
∗)
dα∗
´
. [Note that d lnLz(α
∗)
dα∗ ≈
d lnZ(α∗)
dα∗ −
d lnA(α∗)
dα∗ < −
d lnA(α∗)
dα∗ here and so
0 <
³
d lnLz(α∗)
dα∗
´
/
³
−d lnA(α
∗)
dα∗
´
< 1, as is 0 < lx < 1.].
We find no indication of the violation of the inequality restriction,
1
lx
d lnLz(α∗)
dα∗ < −
d lnA(α∗)
dα∗ from the
several numerical examples, constructed with reasonable parameter values, that show that whenever Z0(α∗) <
0, we have ψ0(α∗) < 0 as well.
6.5 Sectoral reallocation of labor after oﬀshoring
Claim: cx = cz implies that the labor force in the Z sector is smaller in an oﬀshoring equilibrium than under
a no-oﬀshoring equilibrium.
Proof:cx = cz implies ux = uz and
Px = wz +
(r + δ)cz
q(θz)
(76)
The relative demand for Z equal to relative supply in an oﬀshoring equilibrium given in (70)
above can be re-written as
Lz
(L− Lz)
=
γ(1− ux) (Pz)
1
γ−1
(1− uz)(1− γ)
[A(α∗)]−1 (77)
where A(α∗) is defined in (74). Let LOz denote the size of the labor force in the Z sector in an
oﬀshoring equilibrium and LNOz the size of the labor force in the Z sector in the no-oﬀshoring
equilibrium. The expression for LNOz is obtained by setting α
∗ = α in the above expression. α∗ =
α will capture the complete oﬀshoring case. From equation (77) above we see that LOz < LNOz
requires
[A(α∗)]−1 eα < µ Pz
PNOz
¶ 1
1−γ
(78)
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Next, using (76) the expression for Pz given in (67) above can be written as
Pz =
σ
σ − 1Px
⎡
⎣
α∗Z
α
ασ−1dG(α) + ω(σ−1)(1−τ)
αZ
α∗
ασ−1dG(α)
⎤
⎦
1
1−σ
Also, from (60) Px = (Pz)
γ
γ−1 . Therefore,
(Pz)
1
1−γ =
σ
σ − 1
⎡
⎣
α∗Z
α
ασ−1dG(α) + ω(σ−1)(1−τ)
αZ
α∗
ασ−1dG(α)
⎤
⎦
1
1−σ
(79)
Similarly, ¡
PNOz
¢ 1
1−γ =
µ
σ
σ − 1eα−1
¶
(80)
Using (79) and (80) on the rhs of (78) and cancelling terms we get
τ < 1
Therefore, LOz < LNOz for any τ < 1. QED
6.6 Free Entry Case: Condition for ϕ(M) to be decreasing in M
Write the expression for Pz as follows.
Pz =
σ
σ − 1M
1
1−σ
µ
wz +
(r + δ)cz
q(θz)
¶⎡
⎣
α∗Z
α
ασ−1dG(α) + ω(σ−1)(1−τ)
αZ
α∗
ασ−1dG(α)
⎤
⎦
1
1−σ
Note that, for cx = cz case Px = wz +
(r+δ)cz
q(θz)
. Substituting this in the above expression and noting that
Pz = (Px)
γ−1
γ , we can write the above as
(Px)
−1
γ =
σ
σ − 1M
1
1−σ
⎡
⎣
α∗Z
α
ασ−1dG(α) +
P (σ−1)(1−τ)x
w(σ−1)(1−τ)s
αZ
α∗
ασ−1dG(α)
⎤
⎦
1
1−σ
The above implies that
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1−
γ(1− τ)ω(σ−1)(1−τ)
αZ
α∗
ασ−1dG(α)
⎡
⎣
α∗Z
α
ασ−1dG(α) + ω(σ−1)(1−τ)
αZ
α∗
ασ−1dG(α)
⎤
⎦
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
d logPx
d logM
=
γ
σ − 1
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In the case of autarky, α∗ ≥ α, therefore, d logPxd logM =
γ
σ−1 < 1. In the complete oﬀshoring case, α
∗ = α,
therefore, the above implies
d logPx
d logM
=
γ
(σ − 1)(1− γ(1− τ))
Thus, d logPxd logM < 1 as long as
γ
(σ−1)(1−γ(1−τ)) < 1 or (σ − 1) >
γ
(1−γ(1−τ)) . Note from the above that for any
α∗ ∈ (α,α) the condition (σ − 1) > γ(1−γ(1−τ)) is suﬃcient for
d logPx
d logM < 1.
6.7 Parameters for numerical examples
σ = 3.8 and α ∈ Pareto[.2, 3.4] are taken from Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003). δ = .035
corresponds to the monthly average job destruction rate in the United States. The time preference parameter,
r = .03, is in the range of values commonly used in Macro literature. m = kvφu1−φ is the standard matching
function used in the literature and our choice of φ = .5 is in the range of the estimate of this matching
parameter in Blanchard and Diamond (1989) where it ranges from .43 to .75. k = .25 was chosen to get
reasonable values of unemployment rates. The Nash bargaining parameter β = .5 is the most commonly
used in the literature. In the absence of any clear guidance for other parameters we tried many diﬀerent
values and found the results to be robust to their alternative values. We report the results obtained using
some specific values.
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Figure 4: Offshoring Equilibrium With No Intersectoral Labor Mobility
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